Comparison of Models
Annex 1: Comparison of Models
N.B. The following table is intended to provide guidance on the broad categories of models discussed here and is not an evaluative tool. Rather, it sets out typical characteristics, strengths and weaknesses of the models presented above. Because the analysis presented here is of necessity broad, it will not apply as a yardstick for a specific institution.
| TYPE OR MODEL | CHARACTERISTICS | POTENTIAL STRENGTHS | POTENTIAL CHALLENGES |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS | Concentrated in Africa, Asia- Pacific and Commonwealth countries with common law$traditions. Plurality of members who may be full or part-time. Members make decisions. Usually focus on investigations, and often can receive individual complaints. Relatively large professional$sta!. Some have authority to make or seek enforceable orders through tribunals or courts. | Plurality enhances$credibility. Advisory function strengthened by investigation mandate. For commissions with power to enforce orders, can e!ect change directly and provide remedy to victims either themselves or through the courts. Allows complainants free access to court/specialised tribunal, with legal representation.9 | Need to address individual case load may lead to less time to devote to other programme areas. Can be costly to operate, especially if the commission provides free legal services to clients before the courts or specialised tribunal. Investigation processes may become rigid and lengthy given that decisions may be brought to court or specialised$tribunal. Backlogs of cases are common. Quasi-jurisdictional commissions in countries with a weak judiciary may have di#culty enforcing their orders. |
| 2. HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN OFFICES | Found in Scandinavian countries and the CIS. Single member head usually makes key decision. More informal and resolution focused approaches. Findings are usually recommendatory. Relatively large professional$sta!. | Where ombudsman tradition is strong, can be e!ective. Single head can lead to operational e#ciency. More %exibility and less onerous investigatory$processes. Advice-giving function strengthened by investigation mandate. | Findings can be ignored (except for those with authority to seek enforceable decisions). Institution may be seen as being about “one person” and may lack the structural depth of a commission in terms of leadership and sta#ng. Because the ombudsman or commissioner is the head of the organisation, reputation is especially important. This tends to “personalise” the o#ce and can lead to greater di#culties in countries that have not yet developed a culture of respect for the$o#ce. Mechanisms needed to ensure pluralism of operations. Need to address individual case load may lead to less time to devote to other programme areas. |
| HYBRID HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS | Found mainly in Latin America and the emerging democracies of Europe although examples exist in Africa and Asia-Paciffic as well. Share characteristics of human rights ombudsman$offices. Mandate is to protect and promote human rights and deal with malfeasance and/or corruption, and may extend to other issues. | Shares advantages of human rights ombudsman offices. Allows one-stop service to clients. Ensures that issues are dealt with without requiring referral to other agencies. Brings cost efficiencies and minimises conflicts with other institutions. | Breadth of mandate may make it unmanageable and may short-change one or more aspects of the mandate. Risk that resource levels will not match broad responsibilities. Linking human rights to other issues may lead to diminished respect for the fundamental nature of human rights. |
| CONSULTATIVE/ ADVISORY HUMAN RIGHTS RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS | Found in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and in some countries that share a Francophone tradition. Plurality of members assured by incorporating representatives from all social forces as$members. Focus on advice-giving and$research. Usually do not investigate individual complaints. | Plurality enhances$credibility. Absence of individual complaint mechanism means attention can be paid to policy-level and major issues that are of national significance.10 | Risk that debates will remain at the academic level and not promote change in practice. Decision-making may be difficult given size and diversity of decision-makers. Costs of maintaining large number of commissioners may be prohibitive. Absence of complaint-taking function weakens protection mandate. |
9 Not all commissions of this type necessarily provide legal representation in all cases when a case goes to the courts or a tribunal. This advantage only applies to those that do this unless there is a legal aid system in place that can assist clients not assisted by the commission.
10 Some consultative/advisory commissions do investigate individual cases and, where this is so, the commission has recommendatory authority only. Such consultative/advisory commissions will face the same potential difficulties as those NHRIs lacking authority to enforce decisions.